Abstract This paper deals with the problem of obtaining the minimum winning coalition and its stability level. The construction of a coalition is modeled using fuzzy sets by taking into account the position of the members on a set of political subjects of interest. Fuzzy sets allow to consider the nuances and uncertainties that constitute political thinking, making it possible to calculate the distance from each member to all others. We present a binary integer programming (BIP) model to find the winning coalition that minimizes the sum of distances between all its members. Nonetheless, the average time needed to solve this BIP model grows exponentially with the size of the group. This is the reason a heuristic approach is presented to solve this problem. The method solves iteratively, several simplified BIP models based on the concept of α−cuts. Each iteration minimizes the aggregated distance between coalition members, while the stability value α is maximized. The algorithm stops when a minimum winning coalition is found with the highest possible stability. The solution is then improved by a local search procedure that reaches the optimal solution in close to 90% of the simulated cases. The experimental results over these cases show that the heuristic method gives an excellent balance between speed and quality, obtaining, in average, solutions within 1% from the optimum. Coalition formation, fuzzy sets, distance, binary integer programming (BIP), local search.
Introduction
In a parliamentary, democratic system, the members of the parliament elect, from within its ranks, the chief of the government; hence, there is no clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislative. One candidate must obtain an absolute majority of votes of the chamber, in order to be elected as chief of the government. If the majority party, the one with the largest share of seats in the chamber, does not have the required number of votes, a coalition must be formed to obtain an absolute majority. This situation creates a period of uncertainty caused by the negotiations and pacts that parties will make to form government.
Riker [11, p. 12] defines a coalition as the subgroup that, through the rules accepted by all members, can decide for the whole. Kelley [8] adds some conditions to the group of individuals who want to become a coalition. They have to pursue a common and articulated goal, to pool the resources needed to achieve this goal, to engage in conscious communication concerning the goal and the means of obtaining it, and to agree on the distribution of the payoffs received when obtaining the goal.
Coalitions, according to Caplow [2] , can be divided in:
1. Continuous: the objective of the coalition is to control the joint activity of the group to ensure rewards that are always present. 2. Episodic: the objective of the coalition is to secure an advantage in episodic distributions of rewards that occur periodically and under predetermined conditions. 3. Terminal: the coalition has to obtain a single distribution of power. The coalition dissolves when payoffs are secured, and there is a situation that precludes any new redistribution of power.
Government coalitions are episodic, as they get formed after an election that, most of the time, take place at defined periods of time.
Cook [3, p. 1] explains that coalition members expect to collect benefits according to different types of models and strategies. These strategies are based on the amount of resources each member brings to the coalition, and on his level of confidence with respect to other members.
Regardless of the strategy used by the members, Riker [11, p. 32] argues that, in an n−person, zero-sum game with side payments, where players act rationally and have perfect information, coalitions formed have the minimum number of members needed to win. This postulate is called the "size principle of a winning coalition."
The work made on coalitions has been traditionally focused from the perspective of the cooperative game theory, since its inception by von Neumann and Morgenstern [10] . The players cooperate only because every coalition member gets a share of the rewards available to the coalition, a share that gets maximized with the winning coalition.
Our view of the coalition formation process is different, as we would like to find coalitions between individuals that think alike on a set of issues that might differentiate them with other members of the group. To model how each group member ponders these issues, we will use the theory of fuzzy sets, originally developed by Zadeh [12] . By modeling with fuzzy subsets, nuances and uncertainties that constitute political thinking can be captured.
Distance functions can then be used to quantify the difference of thought between all members of a parliament, which in turn allows to find the minimum winning coalition. The concept of "policy distance" is not new as Leiserson [9] and DeSwaan [4] first advanced it in a game theoretical context.
Finding the winning coalition made up of the most similar members of the parliamentary, political spectrum by using distances, allows us to easily assess its stability. As a coalition can only be as stable as its weakest link, then the maximum distance between any two of its members signals the stability level of the coalition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the concept of fuzzy sets and how we model a parliament with them. We present the binary integer programming (BIP) model used to obtain the minimum winning coalition in Section 3. The heuristic algorithm, as well as simulation results on its performance, are shown in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 comprises some conclusions.
Fuzzy model
The mathematical model developed to study the formation of coalitions, departs from the traditional methods based on game theory. Instead of considering a repartition of payoffs between coalition members, we want to find the coalition that maximizes stability according to the degree of similarity between participating members. This similarity is obtained by comparing the distances that separate each parliament member (MP) from the rest. The distances are calculated from assessments made on the position that each MP has on policy issues affecting the constituency.
Fuzzy numbers
We will begin the modelling section making some definitions on the fuzzy subsets that are going to be used on this paper. A fuzzy subsetÃ is a set in which its elements may not follow the law of excluded middle that rules over boolean logic, i.e., their membership function can be mapped as:
In general, a fuzzy subsetÃ can be represented by a set of pairs consistent with the elements x of the universal set X and a grade of membership µÃ(x):
A fuzzy numberM is a fuzzy subset for which:
1. x ∈ R. 2. {x : µM(x) = 1} = ∅, i.e., the normality condition holds.
, where M α is the α-cut forM. This is, the convexity condition holds.
In [7] , a fourth condition which states that in a fuzzy numberM there is exactly one x ∈ R for which µM(x) = 1, is found. However, as Zimmerman [13, 57] explains, for computational simplicity there is a tendency to avoid it, calling "fuzzy numbers" the fuzzy subsets that only meet the first three conditions. Fuzzy numbers used in this paper have their support restricted to the interval [0, 1]. In this paper, fuzzy numbers will be used to model an assessment made by an expert on a subject. The certainty level of the expert on this subject is measured through the area covered by the fuzzy number given as an assessment. Fuzzy numbers used in this work are of the following kinds:
1. A fuzzy number whose support is a single pointx is called a fuzzy singleton, and its membership function is: 
2. An interval of confidence is a fuzzy number that is defined when there is not enough certainty to give an assesment as a singleton, but it can be given as an interval (x 1 , x 2 ). Hence:
3. A triangular fuzzy number (TFN) (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) has a maximun of certainty in x 2 which linearly decreases to zero in x 1 and x 3 . Thus, its membership function is:
4. In a trapezoidal fuzzy number (TrFN) (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) the maximum of certainty covers the interval [x 2 , x 3 ], and then linearly decreases to zero in x 1 and x 4 . Its membership function is defined as:
, otherwise.
Acording to the definition of LR-type fuzzy numbers made in [5, 
The MPs and their similarity
Let T = {t j }, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} be a a set of political subjects, P = {p i }, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the parliament, and
. . , n}, be the political group to which p i belongs. Each MP p i is assesed by an expert on each of the political subjects, setting up a fuzzy subset
Examples of distances for fuzzy numbers are the ones based on the Minkowski distance:
where ω j ∈ (0, 1] is the weight given to each subject j, such that ∑ j ω j = 1. If β = 1 we have the Manhattan weighted distance, while if β = 2 we have the Euclidean weighted distance. Let D = (d i,k ) n×n , be the distance matrix between parliament members. Due to the conditions imposed on the distance function, D is a symmetric matrix with diagonal consisting of all zeros. The similarity matrix for P can be calculated as the complement of D:
where U is a n × n matrix of ones.
Obtaining the minimum winning coalition by minimization of the aggregated distance (MAD) between its members
The first objective of this work is to obtain the winning coalition G min that minimizes the aggregated distance between all its members, using the following BIP model:
s.t.:
where x i is a binary decision variable such that:
and y i,k is a binary decision variable such that:
If both p i and p k belong to the winning coalition, then (10) will make that the distance between them is added to the objective function. When one member of a political group is in the winning coalition, (11) ensures that all of the remaining members of this group also belong to the coalition. Finally, the model obtains the coalition that minimizes the aggregated distance of its members, while keeping an absolute majority through (12) . The size of the winning coalition depends on the presence of political groups in P, as we can see in Theorems 1 and 2 Definition 1 A coalition G is a minimum winning coalition if and only if card(G) = n 2 + 1. Theorem 1 In the absence of political groups, the winning coalition is minimal.
Proof Let G a be a non-minimum winning coalition and σ G a be the aggregated distance between its members. Let G a be a non-minimum winning coalition obtained by removing from G a the member that has the biggest aggregated distance to all the other members. Then, card(G a ) > card(G a ) and σ G a > σ G a . This process can be done until a minimum winning coalition is obtained. Now, let G b be another non-minimal winning coalition such that card(G b ) > card(G a ) and σ G b < σ G a . Then, by using the same process of the first part of this proof with G b , we will get a winning coalition G b such that σ G b < σ G b and is minimal.
Theorem 2
In the presence of political groups, the winning coalition is not guaranteed to be minimal.
Proof Let G a be a winning coalition and σ G a be the aggregated distance between its members. Let Φ f be a political group in the coalition and Φf be a political group not in the coalition, such that card(Φ f ) < card(Φf ). Let G b be the winning coalition obtained by replacing Φ f with Φf and σ G b be the aggregated distance of its members.
The second objective of this work is finding the stability for the solution obtained. Because, as we have seen, the winning coalition is minimal, the defection of one member will render this coalition a loosing one. This is why the stability of the coalition is defined as:
with ξ ∈ [0, 1]. The benefit of this definition of stability is twofold, as it allows to break ties when the model has more than one solution (coalitions with a bigger stability are prefered to those with a small one), and it gives a clear idea of the weakest link on the coalition.
Performance of the MAD model
The MAD model was solved for random generated parliaments 1 with Euclidean weighted distances, using the SCIP-CLP solver 2 [1] on a Dell T3400 computer, with Algorithm 1 Random generation of parliaments with six political groups.
1. Let ϕ i , ∀i = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a random number obtained from Γ(k = 1, θ = 2) , where Γ(·) is the gamma distribution with shape parameter k and scale parameter θ. an Intel Core2 Quad Q9550 processor and 2 GB of 800 Mhz DDR2 RAM, running Ubuntu Linux 9.04 with 2.6.31.1 kernel. For each parliament size, 100 random parliaments were generated, recording the time of solution. From this data, the mean solution time for each parliament size, as well as 95% bootstrap confidence intervals 3 were calculated. The mean time of solution grows exponentially 4 , as seen in Figure  1 , with the size of the parliament, but diminishes proportionally with the number of political groups. For example, when there are no political groups a problem of 350 MPs, the size of the Spanish parliament, the mean time of solution is expected to be 1.91 · 10 12 billions of years. With six political groups, this time is reduced to 580 days.
An heuristic algorithm to obtain the minimum winning coalition using α-cuts and MAD
It is necessary to find an alternative method to obtain G min from P, due to the expected solution time for the MAD model. Our approach lies in the solution of several simpler BIP models based on the concept of α-cut, a threshold for which a fuzzy relationship is considered either true or false. Let A α = (a α i,k ) n×n be the α-cut decomposition of the similarity matrix S for a stability level α ∈ [0, 1], such that:
A α is, then, the adjacency matrix of an undirected graph whose edges join MPs that cannot be together in coalition at the stability level α. The objective is to find the smallest coalition G α which is an absolute majority for this graph.
The solution for this problem is found with the following BIP model:
In this model, MPs that cannot be together in the winning coalition are controlled through (20), while (21) ensures that if one MP belongs to the winning coalition, all the members of his political group will also be in the coalition. As in the MAD model, the objective is the minimization of the coalition's size, constraining it through (22) to coalitions that are absolute majorities. Both, Theorems 1 and 2 can be obtained from the α-cut model, but the model can also have an unfeasible solution when
Based on this model, Algorithm 2 was made to search for the minimum winning coalition through α-cuts. Let α inf = min{s i,k , ∀i < k} and α sup = max{s i,k , ∀i < k}, be the lower and upper bounds of the interval [α inf , α sup ], which is divided in η equidistant points, defining the set α = {α inf , α inf + υ, α inf + 2υ, . . . , , α inf + (η − 1)υ, α sup . For each of the elements in α, let σ α be the aggregated distance for G α 5 . Let α inf = arg min α (σ α ) be the stability level for the winning coalition with the minimum aggregated distance and α sup = α inf + υ, the next element in the ordered set α. If α sup − α inf < the algorithm stops and the solution is G α inf , else, a new iteration of the algorithm is run for the
There is a tradeoff between the time of solution of the algorithm, as it is directly proportional to the size of η, and the posibility of getting out of local minima. σ α is Algorithm 2 Minimum winning coalition through α-cuts.
6. If α sup − α inf < the solution is G α inf , else go to step 2.
not necesarily convex in [α inf , α sup ], as the α-cut process removes the information contained in the distances, defuzzifying it. An η big enough is needed to ease the search of the global minimum, but if it is too big, it might hurt the performance of the algorithm in terms of time of solution.
Finally, the stability of G α inf is given by :
Performance of the heuristic algorithm
Regressions of the mean time of solution for both the MAD model and the heuristic algorithm are shown in figure 2 6 . For the parliament sizes evaluated, the heuristic algorithm, with η = 7, shows a linear increase of the mean time of solution with a very small slope 7 . If we project the mean time of solution for the aforementioned Spanish parliament, 350 MPs, the results are 21.54 seconds for the case when there are no political groups and 227.63 seconds for the case when there are six political groups. As we can see, it is now more difficult to find a solution when there are political groups than it is when they do not exist. This is due to the aggregated constraints defined by (21). The tradeoff for this speed gain is that solutions obtained with the heuristic algorithm are aproximations of the optimal solution obtained with the MAD model. Three more performance analysis metrics are used to see how the heuristic algorithm performs in reference to the MAD model.
The first one, shown in figure 3 , is defined by the proportion of successful trials given by:
where N n s is the times the heuristic algorithm succesfully finds the same solution given by the MAD model for the parliament size n. We can see that the heuristic algorithm (in red) performs remarkably well in the case of six polical groups, with proportions well over 0.9 and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals above 0.85. On the other hand, in the case when there are no political groups, the heuristic algorithm not only does not perform well, but it also keeps performing worse when the size of P increases. This might be due to the plurality of solutions that the heuristic algorithm can reach and which can differ from the solution obtained with the MAD model. For this reason, a second performance metric, is used. The mean relative difference between the aggregated distances of the solutions found with the MAD model and the heuristic algorithm is defined as: performed between 4% to 6% worst than the optimal for the case where no political groups exist, while with six political groups it consistently performed to less than 1% of difference, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals very close to 0%. The third metric used is the stability is compared by using the mean relative difference:
where ξ t,n MAD and ξ t,n α min are the stabilities of the winning coalition found with the MAD model and with the heuristic algorithm, respectively, for the t−th simulation of a n sized parliament. Figure 5 shows that the solutions found with the heuristic algorithm are whithin 2%, and most of times withing 1%, of the stability found by the MAD model for the case with six political groups. On the case where no political groups where considered, the solution with the heuristic algorithm is always less than 4% different that the optimal one.
Because the heuristic algorithm offers a solution that is very close to the optimal solution for the case when there are no political groups, a local search is carried out to find solutions with smaller aggregated distance. This strategy consists of a maximum 10000 1-opt local searches, although the search will stop first if 2500 iterations have passed from the last time a better solution was found. The time added by the strategy is very small (plotted in green in Figure 2 .a), but as it is seen in the blue curves of Figures 3.a, 4 .a and 5.a, its effect in the proportion of succesful trials and in the mean relative difference to the optimal aggregated distance is quite impressive. The proportion of succesful trials has now risen above 0.9 and for most cases is above 0.93, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals very close to 0.98. The mean relative difference to the aggregated distance of the optimal solution is now constantly below 1% and for most of the tests this value is smaller than 0.3%, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals always covering 0.01%. Finally, the mean relative difference in stability shows a performance well below 0.5% with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals always below 0.1%.
Conclusions
This paper presents a BIP model to find the winning coalition that minimizes the aggregated distance between its members. This distance is obtained through fuzzy modelling of the political position of all the members of the parliament, in i subjects of interest to the constituency. This coalition, by means of Riker's size principle, is minimal in the sense that no bigger coalition will minimize the aggregated distance of its members and that any defection will render this coalition a loosing one.
To measure the possibility of a defection, a stability level for the coalition is computed. The stability level is given by the smallest similarity between any two members of the coalition, showing in this way its weakest link. The stability level also allows the differentiation between solutions of the BIP model, as coalitions with bigger stability levels are preferred to those with smaller ones.
A heuristic algorithm based on the concept of \alpha-cuts is presented, as this model mean time of solution grows exponentially with the number of members of the parliament. This algorithm performs much faster, while offering a solution is within 5% of the optimal one.
A local search is carried out to get a better solution. This strategy's contribution to the time of solution is very small, but it is capable of reaching the optimal solution in more than 90% of the cases, while offering solutions within 1% of aggregated distance of the optimal one.
